Deadly Connections States that Sponsor Terrorism

Byman D.978-0-511-12633-8

Avoiding the sensationalism and politicizing that often accompany books on terrorism, Byman examines terrorist groups from the PLO to Al Qaeda to the Tamil Tigers and explains relationships between states and terrorist organizations, providing a fertile discussion ground for how to proceed against both terrorism and the countries that manipulate terrorist organizations for their own purposes. States use terrorism as a multifaceted tool, often to retain political and economic influence, and their patronage includes sanctuary, supplies, logistics, or, as is the case with Iran and Hizbollah, ideological support. The ongoing clashes over Kashmir shows how one country-Pakistan-uses terrorism to fight a proxy war against India, a country it would likely not want to confront in a conventional war. In the wake of the post-September 11 alliance between the United States and Pakistan, Kashmiri insurgents are tolerated in small doses so the government can avoid appearing as if it is capitulating to U.S. pressure. Such muddied situations make it impossible, according to the author, to develop a single strategy against terrorism. The author uses Libya as an example of how a country can, over time (in Libya’s case, over 30 years), fold to various tactics and external pressures to give up terrorist connections. While the book answers a number of questions about why states sponsor terror, it asks just as many about how to effectively sever the ties between the two parties.

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Table of contents :
EEn……Page 1
Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism……Page 2
Copyright Info……Page 5
TOC……Page 6
Tables……Page 7
Acknowledgments……Page 8
Acronyms……Page 10
The Middle East and South Asia [Map]……Page 13
1 – Introduction……Page 14
Key findings……Page 17
Definitions and their limits……Page 20
Book structure and case selection……Page 29
2- Why Do States Support Terrorism?……Page 34
Terrorism as one instrument of many……Page 35
An overview of motivations……Page 39
Motivations……Page 49
Sources of restraint……Page 63
An overview of support……Page 66
Types of support……Page 72
Impact on state counterterrorism efforts……Page 80
The drawbacks of state support……Page 88
4 – Iran And The Lebanese Hizballah……Page 92
Iran and the Lebanese Hizballah……Page 93
Hizballah’s grim track record……Page 97
Type of support……Page 100
Motivations……Page 104
The impact of Iranian sponsorship……Page 110
Sources of conflict and change……Page 112
The Lebanonization of Hizballah……Page 115
Growing costs of supporting Hizballah……Page 118
Final words……Page 128
5 – Syria And Palestinian Radical Groups……Page 130
Syria’s relationship with Palestinian militants……Page 132
Types of support……Page 145
Strategic concerns……Page 147
The limited role of ideology……Page 151
The impact of Syrian support……Page 153
Continued support in the face of pressure……Page 160
Turkey, Syria, and the PKK……Page 163
Conclusions……Page 166
6 – Pakistan And Kashmir……Page 168
Background……Page 169
A renewed crisis……Page 175
An overview of Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri militants……Page 180
Pakistani motivations……Page 186
The impact of Pakistani support……Page 190
Two steps forward, two steps back?……Page 195
Conclusion……Page 198
7 – Afghanistan Under The Taliban……Page 200
The Taliban emerge……Page 202
Pakistan and the Taliban……Page 207
Enter Al-Qa’ida……Page 211
The two movements converge……Page 213
Scope of support……Page 218
Little response to outside pressure……Page 223
Over the brink……Page 228
Al-Qa’ida without a state……Page 229
8 – Passive Sponsors Of Terrorism……Page 232
Definitions……Page 235
Three instances of passive support……Page 236
Saudi Arabia and Islamic radicalism……Page 237
Motivations……Page 242
An end to passive support?……Page 248
Greece and the revolutionary organization November 17……Page 251
Explaining Greek inaction……Page 253
Sources of change……Page 256
The United States and the Provisional IRA……Page 257
Why does passive support occur?……Page 267
A lack of capacity……Page 268
Why does passive support diminish?……Page 269
The impact of passive support……Page 270
9 – The Difficulties Of Stopping State Sponsorship……Page 272
Weathering the punishment……Page 273
An imbalance of stakes……Page 275
Few alternatives to terrorism……Page 276
The dangers of ideological regimes……Page 278
Too narrow a focus……Page 279
A poor conceptualization of the problem……Page 280
Why do states change?……Page 284
10 – Halting Support For Terrorism……Page 286
What instruments are available to states?……Page 288
Backing radicals of one’s own……Page 301
Explaining the Libyan success……Page 302
Lessons for coercers……Page 310
Final words……Page 323
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)……Page 326
Al-Qa’ida……Page 327
HAMAS……Page 329
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)……Page 330
Hizb-ul-Mujahedin……Page 331
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)……Page 332
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)……Page 333
Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) (currently the Kongra-Gel (KGK))……Page 335
Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT)……Page 336
Lebanese Hizballah……Page 337
The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)……Page 339
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and al Fatah……Page 340
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)……Page 341
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC)……Page 342
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)……Page 343
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (N17)……Page 344
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)……Page 345
Bibliography……Page 348
Index……Page 371