I: The Meaning of the First Person Term

Maximilian de Gaynesford9780199287826, 9781423757344, 0199287821

Книга I: The Meaning of the First Person Term I: The Meaning of the First Person Term Книги Психология, философия Автор: Maximilian de Gaynesford Год издания: 2006 Формат: pdf Издат.:Oxford University Press Страниц: 208 Размер: 1,2 ISBN: 0199287821 Язык: Английский0 (голосов: 0) Оценка:I is perhaps the most important and the least understood of our everyday expressions. This is a constant source of philosophical confusion. Max de Gaynesford offers a remedy: he explains what this expression means. He thereby shows the way to an understanding of how we express first-personal thinking. The book thus not only resolves a key issue in philosophy of language, but promises to be of great use to people working on problems in other areas of philosophy.

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Table of contents :
Contents……Page 10
Introduction……Page 12
PART I: Questions about the Meaning of I……Page 20
1. Historical Background……Page 22
To what does I refer?……Page 24
Is I a name?……Page 26
Is I a descriptive term?……Page 32
Is I a (Pure) Indexical?……Page 35
2. Questions of Reference……Page 40
What is Rule Theory?……Page 43
What is the simple rule?……Page 47
What does the simple rule mean?……Page 50
What does the simple rule determine?……Page 52
What is the context?……Page 55
What role does the simple rule have?……Page 58
3. Questions of Expression……Page 62
What is Independence?……Page 66
Is Independence to be preferred?……Page 70
What does Independence explain?……Page 71
Is Independence necessary?……Page 73
What does Independence imply?……Page 76
4. Questions of Logic……Page 79
What is The Guarantee?……Page 82
What does The Guarantee explain?……Page 86
Is The Guarantee supported?……Page 87
Why has The Guarantee seemed convincing?……Page 90
Purism……Page 93
An alternative conception……Page 95
PART II: The Meaning of I……Page 98
6. Logical Character……Page 100
How I behaves in substitution instances……Page 103
What matching constraints reveal……Page 106
How the inferential roles of variant terms are distinguished……Page 108
What is required for the validity of I-inferences……Page 111
How the referential character and inferential role of I are related……Page 113
8. Referential Function (I)……Page 120
What referential function requires……Page 122
What demonstration is……Page 124
Why demonstration is not the determinant……Page 127
What is distinctive about Deictic Terms……Page 132
What referential salience is……Page 134
How the reference of I is determined……Page 137
What has impeded appreciation of I’s deictic character……Page 142
10. Expressive Use……Page 145
How deictic reference is discriminated……Page 148
How the reference of I is discriminated……Page 151
What forms of attention are required……Page 155
What communicative role requires……Page 158
What roles demonstration plays……Page 159
Why the attentive tasks can be easy……Page 163
Summary……Page 174
Contrast with the leading theory……Page 178
Where the findings lead……Page 182
Appendix 1: Analytic Table of Contents……Page 186
Appendix 2: Recurrent Terms of Art……Page 195
References……Page 197
D……Page 204
H……Page 205
L……Page 206
R……Page 207
S……Page 208
Y……Page 209