Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics

Cynthia Macdonald0631186948, 9780631186946

Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics explores the fundamental ontological categories of things; things that we encounter in everyday life, such as material substances, persons, events and universals.
The author begins with a thorough and accessible discussion of the nature and aims of metaphysics. She then goes on to develop tools that can be used to engage in metaphysical thinking about the basic varieties of things.
The book both surveys existing accounts of the natures of these kinds of things, and argues for unique original positions of its own. The arguments support a systematically anti-reductionist view of the basic ontological categories.

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Table of contents :
Preface……Page 7
Part I Metaphysics and Its Tools……Page 11
1 The Nature and Function of Metaphysics……Page 13
The Methodology and Subject Matter of Metaphysics……Page 14
Aristotle’s Conception of Metaphysics……Page 18
Kant’s Conception of Metaphysics……Page 21
A Working Conception of Metaphysics……Page 24
Criteria of Ontological Commitment: Two Examples……Page 46
‘No Entity without Identity’: Identity Conditions for Objects……Page 66
Individuation Conditions, Identity Conditions, and Metaphysical Kinds……Page 69
Principles and Criteria of Identity……Page 73
Part II Particulars……Page 87
Our Ontological Commitment to Material Substances……Page 89
The Bundle Theory and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles……Page 91
Problems with the Bundle Theory……Page 94
The Bare Substratum Theory and the Principle of Acquaintance……Page 120
Objections to the Bare Substratum Theory……Page 123
An Alternative……Page 124
Our Ontological Commitment to Persons……Page 145
Candidates for Persistence Conditions for Persons……Page 148
The Closest Continuer Theory and Its Problems……Page 160
Does the Concept of Identity Apply to Persons?……Page 165
The Multiple Occupancy Thesis……Page 172
Back to Basics: Continuity and Fission……Page 174
A Suggestion……Page 179
5 Events……Page 191
Our Ontological Commitment to Events……Page 193
Three Criteria: Spatio-temporal Coincidence, Necessary Spatio-temporal Coincidence, and Sameness of Cause and Effect……Page 196
The Property Exemplification Account of Events (PEE)……Page 203
Part III Universals……Page 227
6 Universals and the Realism/Nominalism Dispute……Page 229
The Issue……Page 233
Varieties of Nominalism……Page 235
Two Conceptions of Universals……Page 246
The Regress Charge and Two Unsuccessful Attempts to Meet It……Page 249
An Alternative……Page 255
Bibliography……Page 270
Index……Page 282