Regulatory bargaining public law

Jim Rossi0521838924, 9780521838924, 9780511345463

In this book, Professor Rossi explores the implications of a bargaining perspective for institutional governance and public law in deregulated industries, such as electric power and telecommunications. Leading media accounts blame deregulated markets for failures in competitive restructuring policies. In contrast, the author argues that governmental institutions, often influenced by private stakeholders, share blame for the defects in deregulated markets. The first part of the book explores the minimal role that judicial intervention played for much of the twentieth century in public utility industries and how deregulation presents new opportunities and challenges for public law. The second part of the book explores the role of public law in a deregulatory environment, focusing on the positive and negative incentives it creates for the behavior of private stakeholders and public institutions in a bargaining-focused political process. The book presents a unified set of default rules to guide courts in the United States and elsewhere as they address the complex issues that will come before them in a deregulatory environment.

---

Table of contents :
Cover……Page 1
Half-title……Page 3
Title……Page 5
Copyright……Page 6
Contents……Page 7
Preface……Page 9
Acknowledgments……Page 13
1 The Scope of Regulatory Bargaining……Page 17
I Distinguishing Political Failure from Market Failure……Page 20
II Limits of the Legalistic Turn for Bargaining Accounts of Regulation……Page 25
III Regulatory Law as an Incomplete Bargain……Page 28
A Renegotiation, Institutions, and the Reasons for Incompleteness……Page 29
B Some Basic Analytical Observations……Page 32
C Unmasking the Core of Regulatory Law……Page 36
Part I Extending Incomplete Bargains from the Economics of the Firm to Public Governance……Page 45
2 Regulatory Bargaining and the Stability of Natural Monopoly Regulation……Page 47
I The Regulatory Contract, the Law and Economics of Vertical Integration, and Rate Regulation……Page 48
A Incomplete Contracts, Bargaining Renegotiation, and Regulatory Flexibility……Page 49
B An Incomplete Contracts Account of Vertical Intergration in the Utility Industry……Page 51
II Bargaining in the Shadow of Regulatory Law……Page 56
3 The Incompleteness of Regulatory Law: Moving Beyond the “Small World” of Natural
Monopoly Regulation……Page 67
I Ex Ante Incentives, Overinvestment, and Industry Restructuring……Page 70
II Sketching the Deregulatory Landscape……Page 77
III Casting a New Shadow for Regulatory Law……Page 83
4 Refin(anc)ing Retail Service Obligations for the Competitive Environment……Page 87
I Retail Wheeling and Universal Service in Electricity……Page 89
A The Tension Presented by Retail Markets……Page 90
B The Limits of the Telecommunications Analogy……Page 92
II The Efficiency of a Duty to Serve in Deregulated Electric Power Markets……Page 95
Part II Incomplete Regulatory Bargains, Institutions, and the Role of Judicial Review in Deregulated Industries……Page 109
5 Deregulatory Takings and Regulatory Bargaining……Page 111
I Majoritarian Versus Incentive-Based Default Rules for Incomplete Bargains……Page 112
II The Regulatory Contract, Stranded Costs, and the Novel Argument for Deregulatory Takings……Page 116
III The Unpredictable Nature of Land Use Takings……Page 121
IV Takings Jurisprudence in Infrastructure Industries……Page 126
V Incomplete Contracts and Deregulatory Takings……Page 130
A The Limits of Contractual Liability……Page 133
B Problems with Constitutional Takings as a Gap-Filling Measure……Page 137
6 Incomplete Regulatory Tariffs and Judicial Enforcement……Page 145
A Basics of the Filed Tariff Doctrine……Page 147
B The Institutional Context……Page 150
C Judge Friendly’s Criticism……Page 156
II Deregulation and the Judicial Response to the Filed Tariff Doctrine……Page 158
III Strategic Tariff Filings and Radical Deregulation……Page 163
A Influence of the Legal Doctrine on Behavior and Institutional Choice……Page 164
B Enforcement Gaps in the New Tariffing Environment……Page 169
IV Alternatives for Defining the Institutional Enforcement Forum……Page 179
A Substituting Federal Preemption Analysis for the Filed Tariff Shield in Vertical Jurisdiction Contexts……Page 180
B Substituting an Assessment of Primary Jurisdiction as for Filed Tariff Determinations in Horizontal Jurisdictional Contexts……Page 182
7 Bargaining in Decentralized Lawmaking……Page 188
I The Dormant Commerce Clause, Interstate Bargaining, and Competition in the External Market……Page 191
II Judicial Gate Keeping and State Action Immunity from Antitrust Enforcement……Page 204
III Rethinking Judicial Deference in the State Action Immunity Context……Page 211
8 Overcoming Federal-State Bargaining Failures……Page 222
I Jurisdictional Federalism and Its Limits……Page 225
II Coordinated Federalism and Its Limits……Page 230
III Breaking the Impasse for Deregulated Industries……Page 237
A A Presumption Against Federal Preemption of State Economic Regulation……Page 238
B Dissecting the State to Overcome Recalcitrant Legislatures……Page 242
9 Conclusion: Incomplete Regulatory Bargaining and the
Lessons for Judicial Review……Page 249
I Toward a Facilitative, Not Coercive, Account of Regulatory Law……Page 250
II Implications of the Bargaining Perspective for Judicial Review……Page 253
References……Page 257
Cases……Page 273
Subject Index……Page 279