Judicial reasoning under UK

Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson, Roger Masterman0521876338, 9780521876339, 9780511342400

Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act is a collection of essays written by leading experts in the field, which examines judicial decision-making under the UK’s de facto Bill of Rights. The book focuses both on changes in areas of substantive law and the techniques of judicial reasoning adopted to implement the Act. The contributors therefore consider first general Convention and Human Rights Act concepts – statutory interpretation, horizontal effect, judicial review, deference, the reception of Strasbourg case-law – since they arise across all areas of substantive law. They then proceed to examine not only the use of such concepts in particular fields of law (privacy, family law, clashing rights, discrimination and criminal procedure), but also the modes of reasoning by which judges seek to bridge the divide between familiar common law and statutory doctrines and those in the Convention.

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Table of contents :
Cover……Page 1
Half-title……Page 3
Title……Page 5
Copyright……Page 6
Contents……Page 7
List of contributors……Page 9
Foreword……Page 11
Preface and acknowledgments……Page 13
Table Of Cases……Page 16
United Kingdom……Page 23
Canada……Page 26
United States……Page 27
Table Of Treaties……Page 28
Introduction……Page 31
The HRA project: problems, complexities and judicial responses……Page 36
The structure of this book……Page 43
The interpretation of the Human Rights Act……Page 44
The Human Rights Act and substantive law……Page 48
Part I The interpretation of the Human Rights Act 1998……Page 53
Introduction……Page 55
The development of the Convention system……Page 57
The nature of the Convention system……Page 59
The Convention system under pressure……Page 61
The UK and co-operation in the fulfilment of international obligations……Page 64
Some problems of interpretation of the ECHR……Page 66
The HRA and the duty of co-operation……Page 69
Quark……Page 71
Al-Jedda……Page 72
The HRA and positive obligations……Page 74
Limbuela……Page 76
Conclusion……Page 84
Introduction……Page 87
The question of a domestic Bill of Rights……Page 90
Preserving judicial discretion under section 2(1)……Page 93
‘Clear and constant’ jurisprudence……Page 97
‘An over-rigid approach’……Page 99
Departing from Strasbourg……Page 101
Aspiration or foundation? The status of ‘Convention rights’ in domestic law……Page 105
Domesticated interpretations of ‘Convention Rights’……Page 106
Discretion as to the ‘qualification’ analysis……Page 108
Stretching the limits of the judicial role under the Act……Page 112
Conclusion……Page 115
The purpose of this paper……Page 117
What are the requirements of section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, and who are subject to them?……Page 118
The constitutional and institutional roles of decision-makers and their effect on the meaning of ‘compatible’ and ‘possible’……Page 122
Institutional views of (in)compatibility 1: government ministers and departments……Page 127
Institutional (in)compatibility 2: the two Houses of Parliament and their committees……Page 131
Institutional (in)compatibility 3: adjudicators, especially judges of superior courts……Page 133
Forms of rational (in)compatibility……Page 137
Rational (in)compatibilities: logical, practical, conditional and unconditional……Page 138
What readings are ‘possible’? The constitutional and institutional perspectives……Page 141
Conclusion……Page 143
The importance of judicial reasoning……Page 144
Judicial reasoning after Ghaidan v. Mendoza……Page 147
Express terms as a limit on section 3(1)……Page 149
Some comments on Lord Millett’s dissenting judgment……Page 155
Rights and remedies under section 3(1)……Page 157
Section 3(1) as a remedial provision……Page 158
Section 4 as a ‘measure of last resort’……Page 159
The argument from ‘dialogue’……Page 165
Contrasting Ghaidan and Fitzpatrick……Page 167
Conclusion……Page 170
Introduction……Page 173
Horizontal effect: the basic issues……Page 178
The two levels of analysis……Page 179
Direct effect, and ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ indirect effect……Page 180
The pre-Campbell case-law on horizontal effect……Page 184
The analysis of the majority……Page 187
The analysis of the minority……Page 191
Campbell and horizontal effect: conclusions……Page 196
Post-Campbell case-law on horizontal effect……Page 197
Conclusions……Page 202
Introduction……Page 204
Expansionary arguments……Page 209
Distinguishing proportionality from Wednesbury……Page 212
The need for ‘substantial evidence’ and factual inquiry by the courts……Page 213
Treating proportionality as a question of law……Page 218
Use of the policy/fact-finding distinction under Article 6……Page 221
‘Indirect’ deference to Parliament……Page 223
Differential stages to proportionality: prisoners/deportation cases……Page 226
The fair balance approach: reverting to Wednesbury in effect……Page 228
Integrating the approaches: Huang v. Secretary of State……Page 230
Conclusion……Page 232
8 Principles of deference under the Human Rights Act……Page 236
Part II The Human Rights Act and substantive law……Page 243
Introduction……Page 245
Campbell and breach of confidence……Page 250
‘Circumstances importing an obligation of confidentiality’……Page 251
Article 8 and the reasonable expectation of privacy: the touchstone for deciding what kinds of personal information can be protected and when?……Page 254
Campbell reappraised: does it necessitate a Strasbourg-centred approach?……Page 257
The findings in Von Hannover……Page 264
Von Hannover contrasted with Campbell on the scope of private life……Page 265
McKennit v. Ash……Page 270
A v. B……Page 274
Prince Charles’ diaries……Page 279
Conclusions……Page 283
Postscript……Page 284
Introduction……Page 285
Reporting restrictions relating to children……Page 291
Weighing up media freedom against the privacy of the child in the pre-HRA era……Page 293
The Strasbourg clashing rights jurisprudence……Page 296
Clashes between media free expression claims under Article 10 and the child’s private and family life under Article 8 in the Human Rights Act era……Page 300
Initial stance: Article 8 rights of children as exceptions under Article 10(2)……Page 302
Re S: acceptance of presumptive equality and recognition of the ‘difficult balancing exercise’ to be conducted……Page 305
The ‘ECHR jurisdiction’……Page 308
The balancing act between Articles 8 and 10……Page 309
Proper resolution of the conflict under the Human Rights Act……Page 314
Denying the primacy of Article 8, reconfiguring the paramountcy principle and abandoning the Re Z categories……Page 318
Categories within the ECHR jurisdiction after Re S?……Page 321
The parallel analysis or ‘ultimate balancing act’……Page 323
Articles 8 and 10: underlying rationales……Page 324
Articles 8 and 10 as mutually supportive guarantees……Page 325
The structure of the reasoning process and the mechanics of the HRA……Page 330
Conclusions……Page 333
Introduction……Page 338
Opposition to rights-based reasoning in the family law context……Page 339
Sensitive questions of public policy and family law……Page 341
The legal regulation of intimate relationships between adults……Page 342
Deference to Parliament on a sensitive question of public policy: Bellinger……Page 343
Unexpected judicial activism on a sensitive question of public policy: Mendoza……Page 347
Summary……Page 351
An activist approach to the HRA in the public law context……Page 352
Opposition to the language of ‘rights’ in child protection proceedings……Page 354
Difficult questions of public policy: the socio-economic context and the problem of scarce resources……Page 356
Summary……Page 363
Disputes falling outside the scope of the welfare principle: a more positive response to the HRA……Page 364
The welfare principle and a strong resistance to rights-based reasoning……Page 366
Summary……Page 375
Conclusion……Page 376
Introduction……Page 378
The hegemony of ‘helping’ rights……Page 380
The ‘ambit’ as the scope of protection of the ‘substantive’ right……Page 382
Using ‘helping right’ logic to define the scope of Article 14……Page 384
Importing negative language into Article 14……Page 386
State control of the ambit……Page 387
The domestic courts and ‘analogous’ comparators……Page 390
They can’t be the same if the state thinks about them differently……Page 392
‘Right of abode’ or nationality?……Page 396
The ‘homosexual’ label……Page 399
‘Homosexuality’ is an observation, not a fact……Page 402
Sexual orientation discrimination is gender discrimination……Page 404
Conclusions……Page 405
Preliminaries: objectives, taxonomy and method……Page 407
Five judgments on the presumption of innocence as a human right……Page 411
Ex parte Kebilene……Page 413
R. v. Lambert……Page 420
R. v. Johnstone……Page 427
Attorney General’s Reference (No. 1 of 2004)……Page 433
Sheldrake v. DPP……Page 437
Trends and patterns of judicial reasoning under the Human Rights Act……Page 441
Conclusion: human rights and constitutional criminal procedure……Page 452
Introduction……Page 454
Judicial supremacism and deference……Page 456
Statutory interpretation……Page 459
Persistence of common law doctrines……Page 462
The use of convention jurisprudence and precedent……Page 465
Some specific uses of Convention jurisprudence……Page 470
Conclusion……Page 472
Index……Page 474