International justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: virtual trials and the struggle for state cooperation

Victor Peskin0521872308, 9780521872300, 9780511378911

This book tells the compelling story of how the UN International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda prod states implicated in atrocities to hand over their own leaders for trial. Without state cooperation, the United Nations would fail in its mission to help bring perpetrators of war crimes to justice and to rebuild and reconcile war-torn societies. The tribunals’ relative success in overcoming state resistance to international trials is the outcome of a political process that Victor Peskin uncovers and explains. This is the first in-depth, comparative study of state cooperation in the tribunals.

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Table of contents :
Cover……Page 1
Half-title……Page 3
Title……Page 5
Copyright……Page 6
Dedication……Page 7
Contents……Page 9
Maps and Timelines……Page 11
Acknowledgments……Page 13
Permissions……Page 17
Note on Pronunciation……Page 19
PART I: INTRODUCTION……Page 25
1.1 Prologue: Survivors and Suspects……Page 27
1.2 Key Questions and Central Issues……Page 28
1.3 Conceptual Framework……Page 33
1.4 State Interests and the Battle for Victim Status……Page 38
1.5 Overlooked Issues in the Tribunal Literature……Page 40
1.6 Case Selection and Field Research……Page 48
PART II: The Balkans: Strategies of Non-compliance and Instruments of Pressure……Page 51
2.1 Introduction……Page 53
2 Slobodan Miloševic and the Politics of State Coopšeration……Page 54
2.3 International Diplomacy and the Peace v. Justice Conflict……Page 59
2.4 Balancing Peace and Justice at Dayton……Page 64
2.5 Broken Promises: Serbian Non-compliance after Dayton……Page 70
2.6 The Ongoing Peace v. Justice Conflict: Crisis in Kosovo……Page 77
2.7 The NATO Air War and the Miloševic Indictment……Page 81
2.8 Conclusion: After Kosovo……Page 83
3.1 Introduction……Page 85
3.2 First Encounters: Carla Del Ponte, Vojislav Koštunica, and Zoran Dindic (October 2000 through January 2001)……Page 87
A. Miloševic’s Belgrade Arrest and Handover to The Hague……Page 91
B. The Miloševic Transfer and the Rejection of Compromise……Page 95
A. A New Round of Virtual Trials……Page 96
B. International Pressure and Domestic Resistance……Page 98
A. Dindie Moves Against the Serbian Mafia and War Crimes Suspects……Page 103
B. Din die’y Death and its After’s Death and its Aftermath……Page 104
3.6 Back to the Beginning: The Return of Vojislav Koštunica (January 2004 through July 2007)……Page 107
3.7 Conclusion……Page 114
4.1 Introduction……Page 116
4.2 Croatia’s Search for Independence through Victim Status……Page 119
4.3 Atrocities at Home: Croatian War Crimes During the Homeland War……Page 126
4.4 Croatian Cooperation and the Handover of Bosnian Croat Suspects……Page 129
4.5 The Blaški Indictment: Cooperation on Tudman’s Terms……Page 131
4.6 The Cooperation Law Debate……Page 135
4.7 The 1997 Transfers of Bosnian Croat Suspects……Page 136
4.8 Croatia’s Counter-Shaming Offensive……Page 137
4.9 The Battle over the Homeland War……Page 140
4.10 Conclusion……Page 141
5.1 Introduction……Page 143
5.2 The Defeat of the HDZ and the Rise of Croatian Democracy……Page 146
5.3 The Norac Indictment……Page 148
5.4 The Gotovina and Ademi Indictments……Page 151
5.5 The Bobetko Crisis……Page 155
5.6 Rapprochement between The Hague and Zagreb……Page 159
5.7 The Reemergence of the HDZ and the Quest for Europe……Page 161
5.8 The April 2004 Indictments……Page 164
5.9 The Gotovina Challenge……Page 166
5.10 Conclusion……Page 171
PART III: Rwanda: Virtual Trials, International Justice, and the Politics of Shame……Page 173
6.1 Introduction……Page 175
6.2 The Origins of the Conflict……Page 177
6.3 The Rwandan Genocide and the Rise of the RPF……Page 178
6.4 A Call for Justice: Rwanda Requests an International Tribunal……Page 180
6.5 Facing the Genocide: The International Community Calls for a Tribunal……Page 183
6.6 From Consensus to Conflict……Page 185
6.7 Conclusion……Page 191
7.1 Introduction……Page 194
7.2 Diplomacy in Kigali: Goldstone Goes to Rwanda……Page 195
7.3 The Battle for Théneste Bagosora and Froduald Karamira……Page 196
A. Setting the Stage for Acquiescence……Page 201
B. Conflicting Visions of Justice……Page 203
C. The Barayagwiza Appeal……Page 206
7.5 Conclusion……Page 208
8.1 Introduction……Page 210
8.2 A Short-lived Détente……Page 211
8.3 RPF To Investigate or Not to Investigate?……Page 212
8.4 The Battle for Cooperation: Opening Salvos……Page 218
B. The Enemy Within: Genocide Suspects as Defense Investigators……Page 219
C. The “Witness TA” Affair: Laughter in the Courtroom, Outrage in Kigali……Page 223
8.6 Boycotting the ICTR Groups Suspend Cooperation……Page 224
A. Adama Dieng Responds……Page 227
B. The Tribunal–Government Commission Proposal……Page 228
8.8 Conclusion……Page 229
9.1 Introduction……Page 231
9.2 In Pursuit of the Rwandan Patriotic Front……Page 232
9.3 The RPF and the Role of the International Community……Page 234
9.4 “tTrials of Cooperation” and the Witness Crisis of 2002……Page 236
9.5 Protest at the Gates……Page 239
9.6 The ICTR Goes to New York……Page 240
9.7 A War of Words……Page 242
9.8 Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte on “Trial”……Page 244
9.9 Assessing Del Ponte’s Approach……Page 246
9.10 After Del Ponte : Chief Prosecutor Jallow and the RPF Question……Page 249
PART IV: Conclusion……Page 257
10.1 Overview……Page 259
10.2 The Chief Prosecutor as Strategic Actor……Page 262
10.3 Beyond Shame……Page 267
10.4 The Next Generation: The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court……Page 270
A. The Special Court for Sierra Leone……Page 271
B. State Cooperation and the Future of the International Criminal Court……Page 275
Bibliography……Page 283
Index……Page 287